




Information security

Lecture-9

Eng. Taghreed Harfoush

Hash Function

- Converts a variable size message M into fixed size hash code $H(M)$ (Sometimes called a message digest)
- Can be used with encryption for authentication
 - $E(M || H)$
 - $M || E(H)$
 - $M || \text{signed } H$
 - $E(M || \text{signed } H)$ gives confidentiality
 - $M || H(M || S)$
 - $E(M || H(M || S))$

Basic Uses of Hash Function




Figure 8.5 Basic Uses of Hash Function (page 1 of 2)




Figure 8.5 Basic Uses of Hash Function (page 2 of 2)

Basic Uses of Hash Function

(a) $A \rightarrow B: E_K[M \parallel H(M)]$ •Provides confidentiality —Only A and B share K •Provides authentication —H(M) is cryptographically protected	(d) $A \rightarrow B: E_K[M \parallel E_{KR_a}[H(M)]]$ •Provides authentication and digital signature •Provides confidentiality —Only A and B share K
(b) $A \rightarrow B: M \parallel E_K[H(M)]$ •Provides authentication —H(M) is cryptographically protected	(e) $A \rightarrow B: M \parallel H(M \parallel S)$ •Provides authentication —Only A and B share S
(c) $A \rightarrow B: M \parallel E_{KR_a}[H(M)]$ •Provides authentication and digital signature —H(M) is cryptographically protected —Only A could create $E_{KR_a}[H(M)]$	(f) $A \rightarrow B: E_K[M \parallel H(M) \parallel S]$ •Provides authentication —Only A and B share S •Provides confidentiality —Only A and B share K

Hash Function Requirements

- H can be applied to any size data block
- H produces fixed-length output
- $H(x)$ is relatively easy to compute for any given x
- H is one-way, i.e., given h , it is computationally infeasible to find any x s.t. $h = H(x)$
- H is weakly collision resistant: given x , it is computationally infeasible to find any $y \neq x$ s.t. $H(x) = H(y)$
- H is strongly collision resistant: it is computationally infeasible to find any x and y s.t. $H(x) = H(y)$

Common Hash Functions

- MD5

- 128-bit output
- Designed by Ron Rivest, used very widely
- Collision-resistance broken (summer of 2004)

- RIPEMD-160

- 160-bit variant of MD-5

- SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm)


- 160-bit output
- US government (NIST) standard as of 1993-95

- Also the hash algorithm for Digital Signature Standard (DSS)


Message Authentication Code

- Uses a shared secret key to generate a fixed-size block of data (known as a cryptographic checksum or MAC) that is appended to the message
- $MAC = C_K(M)$, send $M + Mac$
- Assurances:
 - Message has not been altered
 - Message is from alleged sender
 - Message sequence is unaltered (requires internal sequencing)
- Similar to encryption but MAC algorithm needs not be reversible


Basic Uses of MAC



(a) Message authentication



(b) Message authentication and confidentiality; authentication tied to plaintext



(c) Message authentication and confidentiality; authentication tied to ciphertext

Basic Uses of MAC

(a) $A \rightarrow B: M \parallel C_K(M)$

- Provides authentication
—Only A and B share K

(b) $A \rightarrow B: E_{K_2} [M \parallel C_{K_1}(M)]$

- Provides authentication
—Only A and B share K_1
- Provides confidentiality
—Only A and B share K_2

(c) $A \rightarrow B: E_{K_2} [M] \parallel C_{K_1}(E_{K_2} [M])$

- Provides authentication
—Using K_1
- Provides confidentiality
—Using K_2

Requirements for MAC Functions

- Assume that an opponent knows the MAC function C but does not know the key k . The following properties are required:
 - Given M and $C_k(M)$, it must be computationally infeasible to construct M' s.t. $C_k(M') = C_k(M)$

- $C_K(M)$ should be uniformly distributed in the sense that for any M and M' , $\Pr[C_K(M) = C_K(M')]$ should be 2^{-n} , where n is the length of the MAC
- Let M' be equal to some known transformation on M . That is, $M' = f(M)$. In that case, $\Pr[C_K(M) = C_K(M')] = 2^{-n}$.

Why Use MACs?

- Plaintext stays clear
- MAC might be cheaper
- Broadcast
- Authentication of executable codes
- Separation of authentication check from message use

Q&A